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Mc K.: Criminal Law--Character Evidence--Doubt as to Guilt

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
CASE COMMENTS
C(uasNAL

LAw-CHARAcEI

EVImENCE-DOUBT AS To GUILT.-

D was indicted for income tax evasion. He admitted that he had
understated his income and defended solely on lack of wilful intent.
Trial was before a jury and the court limited the number of character
witnesses D could present to only one. D requested an instruction
to the effect that evidence of good character alone, when considered
with all other evidence, might create a reasonable doubt as to guilt.
The instruction was refused. D was convicted and later appealed.
Held, reversing the conviction, that character evidence alone may
create reasonable doubt as to defendant's guilt, and further that it
was prejudicial error to refuse the requested instruction that evidence of good character, when considered with all other evidence,
might alone create reasonable doubt of guilt. Peterson v. United
States, 268 F.2d 87 (10th Cir. 1959).
In a criminal trial it is now well settled that the character of
the defendant is relevant in resolving probabilities of guilt. 1 WicmomE, EvmENcE § 56 (Sd ed. 1940). The admissibility of evidence
concerning the defendant's good character was not always recognized, however, and it was "once thought that character was receivable in doubtful cases only, to turn the balance of the evidence."
Ibid. Subsequently, the Supreme Court decided in Edgington v.
United States, 164 U.S. 361 (1896), that, "good character, when
considered in connection with the other evidence in the case, may
generate a reasonable doubt. The circumstances may be such that
an established reputation for good character, if it is relevant to the
issue, would alone create a reasonable doubt, although without it,
the other evidence would be convincing."
In attempting to correct one situation, the Edgington language
has succeeded in creating a new problem which has not been successfully resolved in all the circuits. United States v. Antonelli Fireworks Co., Inc., 155 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1946). Specifically, the problem created is whether or not character evidence alone may create a
reasonable doubt as to guilt, and if so, whether such an instruction
should be given to the jury. The majority opinion of the principal
case represents the minority view among the circuit courts, holding
that character evidence alone may create a reasonable doubt as to
guilt and that the defendant is entitled to an instruction to that
effect. This minority view is shared by the 7th and the 10th circuits.
United States v. Donnelly, 179 F.2d 227 (7th Cir. 1950); Greer v.
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United States, 227 F.2d 546 (10th Cir. 1955). The majority of the
circuits reject this rule and hold that character evidence should be
considered with other probative evidence as tending to create a reasonable doubt of guilt, and that the verdict should rest on all of the
evidence being considered without undue emphasis on any particular testimony. Hoback v. United States, 284 Fed. 529 (4th Cir.
1922). The separate opinion of the principal case by Circuit Judge
Murrab, concurring specially, is in accord with the majority of the
circuits' view.
It appears that the 7th and the 10th Circuits have seized upon
a fine point suggested by the Edgington case, supra, and have enlarged it, finding questionable support in another Supreme Court
decision. Michelson v. United States, 875 U.S. 469 (1948). The
Michelson case states "that such testimony alone, in some circumstances, may be enough to raise a reasonable doubt of guilt and
that in the federal courts a jury in a proper case should be so
instructed."
It is the contention of the separate opinion of the principal case,
and also that of the majority of the circuits, that "nothing said in
the Edgington case with reference to good character evidence was
intended to announce a rule that good character evidence should be
emphasized over other evidence." Petersen v. United States, supra.
Judge Learned Hand has written concerning the Edgington case:
"That case held no more than that a judge should not confine
the use of such testimony [character evidence] to the event
that the jury was already in doubt. There was nothing revolutionary about that, since if once they reached that point, they
ought to acquit in any event.... [E] vidence of good character
is to be used like any other, once it gets before the jury, and the
less they are told about the grounds for its admission, or what
they shall do with it, the more likely they are to use it sensibly.
The subject seems to gather mist which discussion serves only
to thicken, and which we can scarcely hope to dissipate by anything further we can add." Nash v. United States, 54 F.2d
1006, 1007 (2d Cir. 1932).
Judge Grubb has pinpointed the troublesome root in the Edgington
case, upon which the minority of the circuits base their opinion.
"What the court said [in the Edgington case] was said by way of
argument, and not to announce a rue of law to be given in charge
to the jury." Le More v. United States, 258 Fed. 887 (5th Cir. 1918).
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In the principal case the instruction requested by the defendant
and refused by the trial court was as follows:
'"Testimony has been given herein concerning the good character of the defendant. If you believe a defendant has established
his previous good character, you should give that fact due
weight. Such evidence of good character, when considered
with all the other evidence, may alone create a reasonable
doubt."
Refusal to give such instruction amounted to reversible error. The
trial court did give the following instruction:
"You are to consider the evidence, all of the evidence, and after
such consideration return a verdict here into court .... Part of
that evidence consists of sworn testimony of witnesses: ... in-

cluding a character witness ....You take that character witness's testimony into account just as you do any other witness's
testimony here, and you decide the case upon the whole of
the evidence."
This instruction, which undoubtedly would prove sufficient and
proper in the majority of circut courts, was deemed inadequate.
Ia a comparison of the two instructions above, it is difficult
to see any injustice to the defendant's interests occasioned by the
refusal to allow the instruction that character evidence alone may
create a reasonable doubt as to guilt. By not allowing such an
instruction, the trial court merely refused to place any special significance upon the character testimony over that of other evidence.
Le More v. United States, supra.
Undeniably, a fine distinction does exist between "character
evidence alone may create a reasonable doubt" and "character
evidence, when considered with all other evidence, may be sufficient
to create a reasonable doubt as to guilt." But, both statements were
made with the intent to announce the same rule. Nash v. United
States, supra. The words used are true enough if read in the sense
they were written, merely as general statements with a freedom of
range, and not as basic monuments upon which future distinctions
might be erected. The minority of the circuit courts base their
holdings upon a strict interpretation of dicta found in the Edgington and Michelson cases, and seem to disregard that this dicta was
stated in loose support of the Edgington holding, and was never
intended as a separate rule of law. Nash v. United States, supra.
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The holding of the principal case presents a facet of our judicial
system which taxes the efficiency of justice and adds unnecessary
volumes to an already burdened shelf. By insistence upon unenlightened stare decisis, the Petersen case, supra, stubbornly upholds
an outmoded interpretation, which at its best was a misunderstanding. The view expressed by the 7th and 10th circuits appears
to be one of fruitless haggling, the continuance of which adds nothing of value to modern jurisprudence. WiGmome, op. cit. supra.
J. McK.
CmImAL LAw-DouBLE JEOPARDY-NEw TRIAL AFTER REVERSAL FOR INSUFFICIENT EvDENcE.-D was convicted of a nar-

cotics violation, and on appeal was granted a new trial which
resulted in a mistrial when the jury failed to agree. D then moved
for a judgment of acquittal on the grounds that the evidence was
insufficient to sustain the conviction. This the court denied, and
an order for a new trial was issued. Upon appeal, D contended
that such denial would in effect place him in double jeopardy.
Held, that the guaranty against double jeopardy did not prohibit a
new trial even though reversal of the original conviction was for
want of sufficient evidence, nor is the denial of his motion for
acquittal of such a final nature as to be appealable. Gilmore v.
United States, 264 F.2d 44 (5th Cir. 1959).
This case illustrates a deficiency which has been present in
our judicial system from its inception. Under the double jeopardy
clause of the federal constitution, a person is protected from being
twice placed in jeopardy for the same offense, U. S. CONsT. amend.

V, due however to the technical interpretation placed upon the
clause, it is possible for a person to be tried ad infintum for the
same offense. Technically jeopardy attaches to a person when he
has been placed on trial in a court of competent jurisdiction, under
a valid indictment, after the jury has been impanneled and sworn.
Rosser v. Commonwealth, 159 Va. 1028, 167 S.E. 257 (1889). Once
jeopardy has attached it follows through all proceedings subsequent to the start of the trial, but in actuality serves only to protect the defendant if his trial ends in acquittal or conviction from
which there is no appeal.
The difficulty here is the free use of the power of our courts
to order a new trial after reversal. This concept, although not without merit, can, as illustrated by the Gilmore case, work great hard-
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